How do differences between indices affect conclusions about the relationship of inequality to other variables? Kuznets (1963) investigated the association between income inequality and level of economic development in different countries. He noted (p. 17) that the SDL is especially sensitive to the percentage of national income Country WELFARE   APPROACH  TO MEASURING  INEQUALITY received by the poor, while the GC is more sensitive to the share received by the rich,3 and used this difference to explain why these two measures lead to different conclusions about the relationship between inequality and economic development. He went on to show that the developed countries (Tables 2 to 4 ) have lower GCs (indicating less inequality) than the underdeveloped countries, but about equal SDLs.4 Kuznets did not conclude that the latter index does not measure inequality, but rather that level of economic development is not associated with inequality at the bottom of the distribution while it is strongly related to inequality in the top of the distribution.
What are the implications of these results? One implication is that different indices may be measuring different aspects of inequality; another is that different measures may not be equally valid indicators of the same concept. But whether inequality is regarded as unidimensional or multidimensional, we need criteria for evaluating the validity of devices purporting to measure it.
Similarly, we need criteria for determining when one distribution is more unequal than another. Such criteria must, we believe, be based on a prior theoretical conceptualization of inequality.
Since the late 1960s, a considerable literature has developed in economics that addresses these issues: Aigner and Heins (1967) , Kolm (1969) , Kondor (1975) , Sen (1973) , and many articles in The Journal of Economic Theory. We have termed it "the welfare approach to measuring inequality." The roots of this work are found in Lorenz (1905) , Pigou (1912 Pigou ( , 1920 , and especially Dalton (1920) .
Although much of the important work was done in the early 1970s, sociologists seem to be unaware of it. Economists have not only suggested a number of new and important measures of inequality, but they have also clarified many conceptual issues involved in 3 The Gini coefficient is measured on the untransformed income scale; the standard deviation of the logarithm is based on squared differences on a log income scale that magnifies differences at the bottom of the scale while reducing differences at the top. 4 When we used the Mann-Whitney test to examine ordinal differences in inequality between the developed and underdeveloped countries, we found that three measures indicated significant differences (at the 0.05 level) and one did not: Gini coefficient (P = 0.015); mean relative deviation (P = 0.015); coefficient of variation (P = 0.024); and standard deviation of the logarithm (P = 0.378).
determining whether distributions are identical in their inequalities. Although the new measures are embedded in economic theory, we shall show that at least one family of measures (Atkinson's) can be interpreted within a more general framework.
All measures of inequality imply judgement about the definition of inequality, about how to compare the inequality of various income distributions, and about what type of change will have the greatest effect on inequality. The Atkinson measures force the researcher to make these judgements explicit. These judgements will affect substantive findings and conclusions drawn from them.
The theory as developed in economics has two components: a basic theory that is independent of welfare economics and an elaboration of that theory which relies heavily on welfare economics. The basic theory enjoys considerable consensus among economists. We suspect that sociologists will find little that is objectionable and many ideas that are already familiar. Although well developed, the basic theory is incomplete in that it allows us to determine only in certain special cases whether one distribution is more equally distributed than another.
THE BASIC THEORY
We assume that all inequality measures share a number of formal properties. First, they are zero when incomes are distributed equally and positive otherwise. Second, they are impartial in that they do not depend on who possesses what income. The four traditional measures discussed above all exhibit these properties.
The basic theory has three axioms or assumptions. While these axioms do not constitute a complete definition of inequality, we expect most definitions to be consistent with them.
Axiom 1: Principle of Transfers
Basic to any notion of inequality is the idea that inequality is reduced if we transfer income from a richer person to a poorer person. It is understood that the transfer should not be so large that the receiver becomes richer than the donor. This concept has become known as the Pigou-Dalton principle of transfers (hereafter referred to as the transfers principle). by transferring money from rich to poor (in A), then we suppose distribution A is less equal than B. In order to make comparisons between populations with differing numbers of people and differing mean incomes, however, we require two additional axioms.
Axiom 2: Population Symmetry
If two populations are equal in size and identically distributed in income, then income inequality is identical in each. Moreover, it seems reasonable to assume that inequality in the combined population is the same as inequality in each of the two separate populations. Sen (1973) has labeled this concept the symmetry axiom for populations. The symmetry axiom allows us to compare distributions for groups of unequal size but with the same mean income. Given two populations with differing numbers of people (m and n), we need only add the first population n times to itself and the second population m times to itself to obtain two populations with the same total number of people and same mean income. We can then compare one population with the other by using the transfers principle.
Axiom 3: Scale Invariance
The symmetry axiom for populations allows us to deal with populations of different sizes. But how are we to treat populations with different income means? The usual assumption is that if we increase every individual's income by the same proportion then income inequality will remain unchanged. In other words, the size of the pie to be divided has no bearing on the degree of inequality-it is only the relative share each person receives that is important in determining inequality.
Not all students of the problem find this axiom acceptable. Dalton (1920) , for instance, believed that adding the same amount of income to each person's income decreases inequality, whereas proportionate additions increase it. Research to date has not produced a satisfactory conclusion about the acceptability of this axiom. (See Kolm 1976a and 1976b.) For the present we tentatively accept the axiom (which we shall call the scale invariance axiom) and apply it in our work.5
Lorenz Criterion
All three axioms are intimately related to the Lorenz criterion. In applying this criterion the analyst orders people from the poorest to the richest. The Lorenz curve is the graph of the percentage of total income (the Y coordinate) possessed by the X poorest percent of the population. Figure 1 shows the Lorenz curves from the Kuznets (1963) data for Great Britain and Mexico. 5Increasing everyone's income proportionately may leave income inequality unchanged but increase overall inequality. This will occur if income is more unequally distributed than other resources and income inequality is a large part of overall inequality. By increasing everyone's income we increase the importance of income in overall inequality and thus increase overall inequality. Income inequality, however, is the same. A resulting implication is that decreasing income inequality may be considered objectionable if it produces an increase in overall social inequality. The Lorenz criterion provides a means of empirically testing whether, according to our three axioms, one distribution has more (or less) inequality than another. When two Lorenz curves do not cross, the Lorenz criterion is sufficient for determining which distribution has the greater equality.6
Incompleteness of the Basic Theory
Although the basic theory, through the transfers principle and its generalization to the Lorenz criterion, provides a method of comparing distributions, it is incomplete. Some discussions of inequality obscure the theory's incompleteness by failing to consider explicitly distributions whose Lorenz curves cross. This error of omission may reflect an unchecked assumption (built into some economic theories on the distribution of income-see our critique of the SDL below) that Lorenz curves rarely cross. When, however, the Lorenz curves for two distributions do cross, as in Figure 2 , there is no way of using the Lorenz criterion to determine which distribution has more inequality. 
CRITIQUE OF TRADITIONAL MEASURES
We have noted that the traditional measures of inequality do not rank distributions consistently with one another. Here we examine whether the traditional measures are consistent with the basic theory as outlined above. The coefficient of variation and the Gini coefficient are consistent with the basic theory, although they have other properties (discussed below) that many would consider undesirable. On the other hand, neither the standard deviation of the logarithm nor the mean relative deviation is consistent with the transfers principle.
The SDL, which is particularly sensitive to inequality at the lower end of the distribution, may fail to rank distributions correctly when they differ at the top of the distribution. Assume, for example, that we have ten people, nine of whom have $1 apiece and one of whom has $1 million (distribution A in Figure 3) . We now transfer half of this last person's money to one of the other people (distribution B). Before the transfer SDL = 1.80; after the transfer SDL = 2.28, indicating that income inequality has increased. 
Percentage of total population
According to the transfers principle and the Lorenz criterion, however, inequality has decreased. We surmise that continued use of the SDL is based on two premises. First, its statistical properties are well understood and the appropriate procedures for finding confidence intervals or testing for significant differences are known. The second premise is a belief among economists that the distribution of income is approximately lognormal (see Pen, 1971) . If this were true, the SDL would be an entirely appropriate measure of dispersion (or inequality). Lorenz curves of lognormal distributions do not cross, and the SDL and the Lorenz criterion rank all lognormal distributions identically. The problem is that in the Kuznets data crossing Lorenz curves are the rule rather than the exception. Few income distributions in these data are lognormal. Schwartz (1978) presents additional evidence that the distribution of income is not lognormal. We conclude that the SDL is not an appropriate measure of inequality. The MRD fails to satisfy the transfers principle for different reasons. Any redistribution among those above (or below) the mean is not reflected by a change in the mean relative deviation. The The effect of the transfer is thus proportional to the difference in income between the person giving the money and the person receiving it. As long as the transfer is from a richer person (j) to a poorer person (i), the coefficient of variation will decrease, thus satisfying the transfers principle. However, it violates the principle of diminishing transfers because the decrease depends only on the difference between the two incomes and not on the absolute amounts of income (or their ratio to the mean). While this may make the CV appropriate for measuring inequality in other variables, it reduces its usefulness as a measure of income inequality. It is clear that the GC ranks distributions whose Lorenz curves do not cross in the same order as the Lorenz criterion. This is easily seen from the graphic interpretation of the GC described in the appendix. But while the GC is reduced by any transfer from a richer person to a poorer person, the size of the reduction is a linear function of the number of people with incomes between these two.9 8The meaning of "equal weight to transfers at all levels" is slightly ambiguous. This ambiguity is resolved in our later distinction between absolute transfer neutrality (to which the present discussion refers) and relative transfer neutrality.
9 This follows from noting that the Gini coefficient can be expressed as:
(1/Yn2) (2i-n -1)Yj i=l where i is the rank order of the individual in the income distribution (Rothschild and Stiglitz, 1973 (1967) . The principle of diminishing transfers states that the effect of a transfer on a measure of inequality should depend on the incomes of the people giving and receiving the transfer: The greater the difference in their incomes and the lower down in the distribution they are, the greater the effect of the transfer should be. However, it does not state how much greater the effects of such transfers should be. While many analysts would accept the principle of diminishing transfers, we doubt that there is a consensus on this latter issue of magnitude. Furthermore, as we shall demonstrate below, by making different choices one can create measures of inequality that are as inconsistent with each other as are the traditional measures.
As noted above, our objection to the CV is that the effect of a transfer depends only on the difference in incomes between the receiver and giver (Yi -Yj) and does not increase when Yi and Yj are nearer the bottom of the distribution. If there were a family of measures of inequality (defined by a parameter p) in which the effect of a transfer on a measure of inequality were proportional to [(signum p)(YP -YP)], then these measures would be:
1. Consistent with the principle of diminishing transfers whenever -oo < p < 1.
2. Equal to the coefficient of variation when p = 1. 3. Consistent with a principle of increasing transfers whenever p > 1.
Atkinson has proposed such a family of measures. While the selection of different values of p can be interpreted solely in terms of a decision as to how much more weight should be given to transfers at the bottom of the distribution, the discovery of this family of measures evolved from the welfare approach to inequality, which we now discuss briefly.
THE WELFARE APPROACH
Economists have attempted to develop a general theory of inequality that is consistent with the basic theory presented earlier and that would allow us to deal with all situations where Lorenz curves cross. Their approach has been to base the measurement of inequality on a theory of social and individual welfare. Dalton (1920) was perhaps the first to argue that economists were interested not in inequality per se but in the effects of inequality on economic welfare. As he put it: "The objection to great inequality of incomes is the resulting loss of potential economic welfare." This argument has been used to justify the development of a general theory based on notions of individual and societal welfare. Dalton goes on to suggest that the degree of inequality in a distribution should be measured by the loss in welfare that it causes.
By individual welfare an economist means one's sense of well-being, one's happiness or satisfaction with life, or one's potential (given one's resources) for obtaining these things.10 In the literature on income inequality a standard theoretical assumption is that the relationship between income and well-being (the welfare function) is the same for everyone. Economists also assume that increasing a person's income increases his or her welfare and that the effect of income on an individual is independent of other resources that person might possess. This is equivalent to assuming that Duncan (1975) . 13 For a discussion of the independence assumption and its substantive importance for the distribution of income see Harsanyi (1955) , Strotz (1958 Strotz ( , 1961 , and Fisher and Rothenberg (1961, 1962) . assure that, for a given total income, egalitarian distributions will result in greater social welfare than inegalitarian distributions.
There are severe problems in constructing a general social welfare function from individual welfare functions, especially if individual welfare functions can reflect attitudes about how income ought to be distributed, as well as about the well-being received from the particular income possessed by an individual. (See Arrow, 1963, for a discussion of his "impossibility theorem.") Hamada (1973) has shown that these same problems exist in the specific case of income inequality. Nonetheless, we surmise that sociologists will find the additive social welfare function a useful model-partly because it is the simplest functional form consistent with the standards to be met by a good measure of inequality.
MEASURES OF INEQUALITY
We now define measures of inequality based on functions for individual and social welfare. Dalton (1920) symmetry axiom is that the maximum possible value of our measure depends to a limited extent on the population size.
The advantage of using equally distributed income equivalents is that it allows us to make weaker assumptions about the measurability of welfare. Social welfare only needs to be ordinally measurable; if we can rank societies according to their level of social welfare, then we shall be able to rank them in terms of inequality. If social welfare is additive, then I' becomes:
In this case we need only be able to measure individual welfare in terms of an interval scale; we need only know the relationship between income and welfare to within a linear transformation. Therefore I' will usually depend on fewer parameters than I*. 
CONSISTENCY WITH THE BASIC THEORY
Note that when e equals -1, Formula (6) is equivalent to the coefficient of variation. The assumptions and the potential weaknesses of this "decadence approach" to measuring inequality are analogous to those of the welfare approach. We are now in a position to make a very strong claim, however. Any measure of inequality that is an increasing monotonic function of a sum of functions of individual incomes and satisfies the three axioms of the basic theory must be equivalent at the ordinal level to one of the measures in Formulas 17 This alternative approach is consistent with a puritan or otherworldly perspective in which income is seen as having undesirable consequences for both the individual and society. Some might wish to substitute concepts of individual and social anomie (or tension) for decadence. Our purpose is to demonstrate the logical consistency of this alternative approach with the basic theory of inequality. India is considered to have a more equal distribution of income. As e increases, incomes at the bottom are weighted more heavily, as may be seen by letting e go to infinity. In this case pairs of distributions will be ranked by the lowest point at which the associated Lorenz curves diverge, which generally corresponds to the difference between the incomes (divided by their respective means) of the poorest person in each distribution (Hammond, 1975) . Similarly, if e goes to negative infinity, distributions will be ranked by the highest point at which the Lorenz curves diverge. If two Lorenz curves cross exactly once, there will be a cutoff value of e such that the Lorenz curve which is higher at the bottom will be judged less unequal whenever e is greater than the cutoff and more unequal whenever e is less than the cutoff.
Our final interpretation of e is a reformulation of the previous one, but from a slightly different perspective. Deciding how heavily to weight different portions of the Lorenz curve is formally equivalent to deciding where in the distribution transfers are most important. Prior to the discussion of the welfare approach, we introduced a fourth axiom-the principle of diminishing transfers-stating that the effect of a transfer between two people whose incomes differ by a specified amount should be inversely related to their absolute position in the population. We suggested the existence of a family of measures of inequality that would allow the user to make a normative judgment as to how strong the principle of diminishing transfers should be. The measures specified by Formulas (3) through (6) We observed earlier that when e = -1, Atkinson's measure of inequality equals the coefficient of variation-the effect of a transfer depends only on the absolute difference between Yi and Y, not on their position in the distribution. We refer to this latter property as absolute transfer neutrality. The CV has the highest (least negative) value of e that fails to satisfy the principle of diminishing transfers. When e is less than -1, inequality will be consistent with the principle of increasing transfers, which emphasizes the importance of transfersfrom the rich (rather than to the poor), presumably in order to reduce individual and social "decadence." When e is greater than -1, the principle of diminishing transfers is satisfied, with increasing emphasis placed on transfers to the poor as e increases. When e equals zero, we use Theil's measure and find that the effect of a transfer on inequality depends only on the ratio of the receiver's income to the giver's income. This property is referred to as relative transfer neutrality. For values of e greater than zero (that is, those which are consistent with the welfare theory approach), measures of inequality are also consistent with the principle of relative diminishing transfers. This principle states that the effect of a transfer to one person from someone whose income is a fixed proportion higher (say double) diminishes as the absolute level of their incomes increases. For example, a small transfer to a person with $7,500 from someone with $15,000 is more effective in reducing inequality (or increasing social welfare) than a transfer of the same size to a person with $15,000 from someone with $30,000. (Obviously, relative transfer neutrality implies that these two transfers would have the same impact on inequality.) Finally, when e is between -1 and 0, the principle of diminishing absolute transfers is satisfied but not the principle of diminishing relative transfers.
We have discussed several interpretations of e. Sociologists may be reluctant to place much stock in the first two interpretations because they are so deeply embedded in economic welfare theory. But, as the remaining interpretations demonstrate, Atkinson's measure and its parameter e can be interpreted from a more general and practical framework that does not require the researcher to accept the many assumptions of the welfare approach. This is not to say that one's choice of e can be value-free, since it depends on judgments about how different portions of the Lorenz curve should be weighted in a measure of inequality or how different types of transfers should affect a measure of inequality.
Selecting Values of e
How then is one to choose e from the range between positive and negative infinity? (Remember: If no Lorenz curves cross, then the choice of e is irrelevant.) Before addressing this question, we think it is important to reflect upon the intended use of the measure of inequality. Sen (1973) makes a useful distinction between descriptive and normative measures of inequality. Our viewpoint differs from Sen's, however. We do not think that the distinction lies between different measures, but rather between different uses of the same measure. Research questions such as "Has inequality declined in the United States over the past thirty years?" or "Is income distributed more equally in developed societies than in underdeveloped societies?" implicitly raise issues of fairness and justice. If the data are of sufficient quality and the Lorenz curves do not cross, then the answer is unambiguous. If, as we suspect will often be the case, Lorenz curves do cross, then a normative question can only be answered within the context of a normative definition of inequality. Earlier we raised the issue of whether inequality is a unidimensional or multidimensional concept. It seems to us that normative definitions of inequality are usually unidimensional. If this is the case, the researcher must choose that value of e, presumably based on at least one of the interpretations offered above, which best corresponds to his or her definition of inequality. In the event of uncertainty, it would be prudent to apply a range of values of e. In this way one can judge the sensitivity of results to systematic changes in the normative definition of inequality. If the principle of diminishing absolute transfers is assumed, then e must be greater than -1. If, in addition, the principle of diminishing relative transfers is assumed, then e must be greater than zero. We suspect that after reflecting on the different interpretations of e, most sociologists would agree that when using Atkinson's measure to address normative questions, e should be between -0.5 and 2.5.
Some attempts based on the standard welfare approach have been made to estimate empirically the appropriate value of e. Stevens (1959), Schwartz (1974) , and Winship (1976) 
